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I think we have to distinguish between the theoretical and the practical. I believe that
when [Chief Prosecutor] Justice Arbour starts her investigation [into the events in
Kosovo], she will because we will allow her to. It's not Milosevic that has allowed
Justice Arbour her visa to go to Kosovo to carry out her investigations. If her court, as we
want, is to be allowed access, it will be because ofNATO.
;;

- Jamie Shea, NATO Spokesperson, May 16, 1999, responding to a question
regarding the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia's
jurisdiction over NATO actions in Kosovo.1

t Attorney-Adviser, U.S. Department of State. This article was written while the author was
a fellow at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University. Paige Chabora, Jonathan Charney, Brannon Denning, Matthew Goldin, Steven Hill, Karen
Johnson, Sarah Lytle, Michael Reisman, Christopher Rickerd, Andrew Tauber, and the members of the
Carr Center deserve thanks for comments made on earlier drafts. The views expressed are the author's
own and not necessarily those of the StateDepartment or the U.S. Government.
I.
Press Conference given by Jamie Shea, NATO Spokesperson, and Major General Walter
Jertz, SHAPE Spokesperson (May 16, 1999), available at http://www.nato.int/kosovo/press/
p990516b.htm.
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INTRODUCTION

There has been relatively little interest in the rights of the accused before
international criminal courts.2 This can be explained, in part, by the unsavory
background of a large number of the persons accused and the severity of the
crimes alleged, as well as by overwhelming concern for the rights of the
victims.3 It also can be explained by the reversal, in the international context,
of the typical left/right domestic political alignment on prosecutorial
prerogatives. 4 Proponents of the creation of a permanent international
institution devoted to the prosecution of genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity come mostly from the political left, the domain of the socalled "soft-on-crime" liberals who tend to think more about the rights of the
accused.5 In their bid for an effective court, they have, contrary to type, taken
a position in favor of a strong prosecutor-a stance in tension with the rights
of the accused. On the other hand, the opponents of international criminal
tribunals, or at least the International Criminal Court (ICC), usually come
from the political right, hardly the haven of the Alan Dershowitzes of the
world. Their background makes them, in general, less sensitive to defendants'
rights, and their goal, in any case, is preventative, not ameliorative. Lack of
interest in the rights of the accused can also be ascribed to the attraction, for
advocates, detractors, the media, and academics, of other important questions
raised by international criminal law. For example, significant disagreement
exists about whether the international criminal process (or a trial at all) is the
best means to achieve justice for these sorts of crimes; 6 whether the United

2.
These courts are, presently, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). I speak here, as well, of the future
International Criminal Court (ICC). I do not discuss the possible future tribunals for Cambodia and
Sierra Leone.
3.
See, e.g., Michael Bachrach, The Protectionand Rights of Victims Under International
CriminalLaw, 34 INT'L LAW. 7 (2000); Theo van Boven, The Positionofthe Victim in the Statuteof the
InternationalCriminal Court, in REFLECTIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ESSAYS IN

HONOUR OF ADRIAAN Bos 77 (Herman A.M. von Hebel et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter REFLECTIONS ON
THE ICC].
4.
See Henri Astier, Rights of the Despised, AM. PROSPECT, Aug. 14, 2000, at 30. But cf.
Bruce Broomhall, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Letter to the Editor, AM. PROSPECT, Sept, 11,
2000, at 6.
5.
NGOs have been unusually silent with regard to the rights of defendants before
international courts. Some have considered the issue, often under the rubric of making these courts
effective. See Pre-TrialRights in the Rules ofProcedureand Evidence, INT'L CRIM. COURT BRIEFING
SERIES (Lawyers Comm. for Hum. Rts., New York, N.Y.), Feb. 1999; AMNESTY INT'L, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA: TRIALS AND TRIBULATIONS,
1.2 (1998); LAWYERS COMM. FOR
HUM. RTS., FAIRNESS TO DEFENDANTS AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: PROPOSALS TO
STRENGTHEN THE DRAFT STATUTE AND ITS PROTECTION OF DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS (1996); see also
LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., WHAT IS A FAIR TRIAL? A BASIC GUIDE TO LEGAL STANDARDS AND
PRACTICE (2000). As a consequence, the main advocate for the rights of the accused has been the

International Criminal Defence Attorneys Association. E.g., Elise Groulx, Presentation on the Rights of
the Accused Before the ICTY (Nov. 7-8, 1998), available at http://www.hri.ca/partners/aiadicdaa/reports/belgrade.htm.
6.
See, e.g., MARTHA MiNOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY
AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998); RUTI G. TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2000); Jos6 E.

Alvarez, Crimes ofStates/CrimesofHate: Lessonsfrom Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 365 (1999); Mark
A. Drumbl, Punishment,Postgenocide:From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1221 (2000).
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States should sign7 and ratify8 the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court; 9 whether the future permanent court should have jurisdiction over
nationals of non-States-Parties; 1° and how the substantive criminal law of the
future court and the current ad hoc tribunals should be defined.' Finally, the
absence of interest in defendants' rights can be attributed to the probable
assumption that any international criminal tribunal created by the efforts of so
many thoughtful people, modeled on Western legal systems, and run by
upstanding individuals, will, of course, adhere to the highest standards of
propriety and fairness.' 2 For these reasons, the question "Can international
criminal courts provide defendants
with fair trials?" is one that has barely
3
been posed, let alone answered.'
7.
The United States signed the Rome Statute on December 31, 2000, the last day possible
for doing so. See Steven Lee Myers, US Signs Treatyfor World Court to Try Atrocities,N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 2001, atA1.
8.
See, e.g., Written Statement of Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr. before the
Subcommittee on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States
Senate, (July 23, 1998), available at 1998 WL 12762551 [hereinafter Casey & Rivkin, Foreign
Relations Statement]; Bartram S. Brown, U.S. Objections to the Statute of the InternationalCriminal
Court:A BriefResponse, 31 N.Y.U. I. INT'L L. & POL. 855 (1999); COUNCIL. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
TOWARD AN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT? THREE OPTIONS AS PRESIDENrIAL SPEECHES (1999)

availableat http://www.cfr.orgtpublic/pubs/CriminalCourtCPL.html; Ruth Wedgwood, The Constitution
and the ICC, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SECURITY

AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 119 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000) [hereinafter THE UNITED
STATES AND THE ICC]; Paul D. Marquardt, Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality of an
InternationalCriminalCourt,33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 73 (1995); Scott W. Andreasen, Note, The
InternationalCriminalCourt: Does the ConstitutionPrecludeIts Ratificationby the UnitedStates?, 85
IOWAL. REV. 697 (2000).
9.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9* (1998), 37
I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
10.
See, e.g., Casey & Rivkin, Foreign Relations Statement, supranote 8; Eve La Haye, The
Jurisdictionofthe InternationalCriminalCourt: Controversiesover the Preconditionsfor ExercisingIts
Jurisdiction,46 NETH. INT'L L. REv 1 (1999); Madeline Morris, High Crimes andMisconceptions: The
ICCandNon-party States, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 219 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000); Michael P. Scharf, The ICC's
Jurisdictionoverthe NationalsofNon-party States, in THE UNITED STATES AND THE ICC, supra note 8,
at 213.
11. See, e.g., MARK J. OSiEL, OBEYING ORDERS: ATROCITY, MILITARY DISCIPLINE, AND THE
LAW OF WAR (1999); Kelly D. Askin, Sexual Violence in DecisionsandIndictments ofthe Yugoslav and
Rwandan tribunals: CurrentStatus, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 97 (1999); Simon Chesterman, An Altogether
Different Order: Defining the Elements of CrimesAgainstHumanity, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 307
(2000); Grant M. Dawson, DefiningSubstantive Crimes Within the Subject Matter Jurisdictionof the
InternationalCriminalCourt: What isthe Crime ofAggression?, 19 N.Y. L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
413 (2000); Margaret McAuliffe deGuzman, The Roadfrom Rome: The Developing Law of Crimes
Against Humanity, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 335 (2000); Paola Gaeta, The Defence of Superior Orders: The
Statute of the InternationalCriminalCourt Versus CustomaryInternationalLaw, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L.
172 (1999).
12.
Of course, the discussion in this Article should not be taken as a negative commentary on
the motivations or capabilities of the advocates of, or current or future participants in, the international
criminal tribunals.
13.
On the right to a fair trial generally in international law, see David Harris, The Right to
FairTrialin CriminalProceedingsas a Human Right, 16 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 352 (1967). There are a
few pieces that focus on the general question of fair trials in connection with the ad hoc tribunals and the
future ICC. Eg., James Sloan, The InternationalCriminalTribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia andFair
TrialRights: A Closer Look, 9 LEIDEN I INT'L L. 479 (1996); Colin Warbrick, InternationalCriminal
CourtsandFairTrial,3 J. ARMED CONFLICT L. 45 (1998); Michatl Wladimiroff RightsofSuspects and
Accused, in 1 SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: THE
EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL COURTS 415 (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia
Swaak-Goldman eds., 2000); Vincent M. Creta, Comment, The Search for Justice in the Former
Yugoslavia and Beyond: Analyzing the Rights of the Accused Under the Statute and the Rules of
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Once raised, however, the centrality of the question to the enterprise of
international criminal justice cannot be doubted, and rarely is. If trials are
unfair, or perceived to be unfair, international criminal courts-the two ad hoe
tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the
future permanent International Criminal Court (ICC)-might quickly lose
their legitimacy. Worse still, the entire enterprise of justice for these types of
heinous crimes, whether in international courts, domestic courts, or otherwise,
might be dealt a serious blow. As Richard Goldstone, first Chief Prosecutor
for the ad hoc tribunals, has commented, "Whether there are convictions or
whether there are acquittals will not be the yardstick [of the ICTY]. The
"14
measure is going to be the fairness of the proceedings ....
Yet, there are additional, sometimes countervailing, considerations that
make the concept of fair trials particularly complex for international criminal
courts. One of these is accountability. The extreme character of the crimes
alleged before international criminal courts makes the case for accountability
stronger than in domestic prosecutions. Added to the heightened influence of
accountability is the enduring pertinence of state sovereignty. While the
tribunals mark an historic encroachment on sovereignty, there remain strong
and legitimate interests in maintaining many of the powers and prerogatives of
states. These state interests (national security, most obviously) are often in
tension with fair trial standards. In turn, the absence of a strong community of
"watchdog" observers for fair trial proceedings serves to underpin these
powerful interests. Thus, the realm of international criminal justice is
distinguished from domestic criminal justice not simply because
accountability and sovereignty weigh heavier in this context, but also because
of the absence of an effective counterweight to check these interests. So while
the idea of fair trials is hardly controversial in and of itself, the application of
this idea to international crimes in international settings is more complex.
The fair trial question can be approached in at least two ways.' First, are
the substantive rights accorded to the accused adequate? This approach
focuses on the rights delineated in the tribunals' statutes, rules of procedure
and evidence, and case law-for example, the right to confront witnesses or

ProcedureandEvidence of the InternationalCriminalTribunalforthe Former Yugoslavia, 20 HOUS. J.
INT'L L. 381 (1998); Scott T. Johnson, On the Road to Disaster: The Rights of the Accused and the
InternationalCriminalTribunalforthe FormerYugoslavia, 10 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 111 (1998). On how
increasing international law-enforcement cooperation may have an impact on the rights ofthe accused in
national courts, see Diane Marie Amann, The Rights of the Accused in a Global EnforcementArena, 6
ILSA J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 555 (2000); and Robert J.Currie, Human Rights and InternationalMutual
LegalAssistance:Resolving the Tension, 11 CRiM.L. F. 143 (2000).
14. Mark S. Ellis, Achieving Justice Before the International War Crimes Tribunal:
Challengesfor the Defense Counsel, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 519 n.37 (1997) (quoting Chief
Prosecutor Richard Goldstone). See also Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 106, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), 32
I.L.M. 1163, 1185 [hereinafter Secretary-General's Report) ("It is axiomatic that the International
Tribunal must fully respect internationally recognized standards regarding the rights of the accused at all
stages of its proceedings.").
15. This categorization does not include the accusation, made by some, that the ad hoc
tribunals, particularly the ICTY, are inherently political and unfair. For an example ofthis point of view,
see Michael Mandel, Milosevic Hasa Point,GLOBE &MAIL (Toronto), July 6, 2001, at A15.
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the right to counsel. 6 The answer to this aspect of the fair trial question is
complicated by the unique structures of these courts, which are cobbled
together from the civil law and common law legal systems. 17 Furthermore,
there are inherent difficulties in prosecuting these types of crimes, which,
according to some,' 8 might call for extraordinary trial procedures, at least from
the perspective of domestic legal norms.' 9
A second approach to the problem of fair trials asks, instead, whether
these international courts have the independence and coercive powers
necessary to ensure fair trials, regardless of the sufficiency of the paper rights
accorded the accused in the tribunals' statutes. For example, can these courts
make certain that the accused is able to obtain the evidence and witnesses
necessary for a serious defense?20 Or do the courts' judges have the
independence necessary to withstand political pressure from the states on
which they depend?21 In other words, despite the good intentions of the
architects of these statutes, and the rights they formalistically contain, might
these courts still lack certain essential capacities that criminal courts require in
order to fulfill their functions satisfactorily?
It is this second crucial, but often overlooked, aspect of the fair trial
problem that I would like to take up here. A review of tribunal case law and
past practice indicates that international criminal tribunals, as presently
16.
Some of these issues are noted briefly in Jos6 E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of the
TadicJudgment, 96 MICH. L. REv. 2031, 2061-68 (1998). Useful commentary on fair trial rights in the
Rome Statute appears in William A. Schabas, Article 67: Rights of the Accused, in COMMENTARY ON
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INrEINATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 845 (Otto Triffierer ed., 1999).
17. See Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? ConstitutionalCriminalProcedurein
an InternationalContext, 75 IMD. L.J. 809, 848-50 (2000); PanelDiscussion:Association ofAmerican
Law Schools Panelon the InternationalCriminalCourt, 36 AM. CRiL. L. REV. 223, 251-56 (1999)
(comments of Christopher L. Blakesley).
18.
See, e.g., Developments in the Law-InternationalCriminalLav, 114 HARv. L. REV.
1943, 1985-93 (2001).
19. There have been scattered articles dealing with particular substantive aspects of the fair
trial right in the context of international criminal law. On confrontation, see Natasha A. Affolder, Tadic,
the Anonymous Witness and the Sources of InternationalProceduralLav, 19 MCH. J. INT'L L. 445
(1998); Christine M. Chinkin, Editorial Comment, DueProcessand WitnessAnonymity, 91 AM. I. INr'L
L. 75 (1997); Monroe Leigh, Editorial Comment, The Yugoslav Tribunal: Use of Unnamed Witnesses
AgainstAccused, 90 AM. J. INT'LL. 235 (1996); Monroe Leigh, Editorial Comment, Witness Anonymity
is Inconsistent with Due Process,91 AM. J. INT'L L. 80 (1997); and Sara Stapleton, Note, Ensuringa
Fair Trial in the InternationalCriminalCourt: Statutory Interpretationand the Impermissibility of
Derogation,31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 535 (1999). On the right to counsel, see Kenneth S. Gallant,
The Role andPowers of Defense Counsel in the Rome Statute of the InternationalCriminalCourt,34
INT'L LAW. 21 (2000). On proceedings in absentia, see Daniel J. Brown, The InternationalCriminal
Court and Trials in Absentia, 24 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 763 (1999); and Mark Thieroff & Edward A.
Amley, Jr., Proceeding to Justice and Accountability in the Balkans: The InternationalCriminal
Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia and Rule 61, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 231 (1998). On the privilege
against self-incrimination, see Diane Marie Amann, A Whipsaw Cuts Both Ways: The PrivilegeAgainst
Self-Incrimination in an InternationalContext, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1201 (1998). On the admission of
evidence, including hearsay, and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, see Richard May &
Marieke Wierda, Trends in InternationalCriminal Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague, and
Arusha, 37 COLuM. I. TRANSNAT'L L. 725 (1999). On search and seizure, see George E. Edwards,
InternationalHuman Rights Law Challengesto the New InternationalCriminalCourt: The Search and
Seizure Right to Privacy,26 YALE . INT'L L. 323 (2001). On fairness and speedy trials, see Patrick L.
Robinson, EnsuringFairandExpeditious Trials at the InternationalCriminalTribunalforthe Former
Yugoslavia, 11 EUn. J. INT'L L. 569 (2000). For case studies of the fair trial right in national legal
systems, see THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL (David Weissbrodt & Radiger Wolfrum eds., 1997).
20.
See infraPartIV.
21. See infraPartV.
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constituted, are limited in their ability to provide defendants with fair trials.
Indeed, even if the statutory rights accorded the accused and the positive
pronouncements made by these courts are consonant with fair trial
standards, 22 shortcomings persist because the courts lack the requisite power,
or its functional equivalent, to make those substantive rights real. In short, the
disjunction between authority and control, common to international
institutions, is too great to allow for consistently fair criminal adjudication.
Whether the structural limitations on the tribunals are fatal, or whether their
detrimental effects can be abated, remains to be seen.
Part II of this Article identifies the basic fair trial rights at risk. Part III
begins to explain why this may be so by describing how international criminal
tribunals obtain the essentials of their existence through state cooperation.
Parts IV and V explore how this cooperation regime has affected the ability of
the ICTY and the ICTR to provide defendants with fair trials. Part VI
evaluates whether the ICC is an improvement and outlines a number of
possible ways to counter the fair-trial-limiting tendencies that plague
international tribunals.
II.

FAIR TRIAL STANDARDS

In order to know whether we should worry at all about fair trials in
international criminal courts, we must first determine the standard by which
these trials should be judged. 23 This is not as straightforward as one might
think. Part of the difficulty results from the sui generis nature of these courts.
They are not national courts, to which international conventions would more
clearly apply. Nor do they replicate the rights or rules of any single legal
system. The difficulties are compounded for the ad hoc tribunals. Their
statutes contain no choice of law provisions, similar to article 38 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice or to those that appear in some national
constitutions, such as South Africa's, 24 which detail the sources of law for
judges to look to when interpreting fair trial rights. These difficulties give rise
to tricky interpretive questions for lawyers, judges, and commentators. 5
Though panels of the ad hoc tribunals applied divergent approaches to
the interpretation of fair trial rights early on,2 they have recently opted for a
22. Cf Decision as to Admisibility, Naletilic v. Croatia, Application no. 51891/99, European
Court of Human Rights, May 4, 2000, l(b) ("Involved here is the surrender to an international court
which, in view of the content of its Statute and Rules of Procedure, offers all the necessary guarantees
including those of impartiality and independence.").
23.

For a general discussion, see CHRISTOPH J. M. SAFFERLING, TOWARDS AN INTERNATIONAL

CRnMNAL PROCEDURE 25-27, 42-44 (2001).
24.
S. AFR. CONST. sec. 39.
25. See Claire Harris, Precedentin the Practiceof the ICTY, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE
AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD 341 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001)
[hereinafter ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE].

26. Compare Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion Requesting Protective Measures for
Victims and Witnesses, The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber, International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Aug. 10, 1995,
18-30, available at
http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/decision-e/100895pm.htm (adopting the "object and purpose"
approach ofarticle 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law ofTreaties in an interpretation of article 21
of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The Trial Chamber
categorically distinguished case law that interpreted parallel fair trial provisions in two international
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technique that takes the practice of national courts and regional human rights
tribunals as a baseline. This approach was endorsed in a decision of the
Delalic trial chamber,27 and elaborated in the Kupreskic trial chamber
judgment.2 8 And though the ICTY refuses to adopt a strict test, chambers,
including the Appeals Chamber, have consistently looked to the practice of
national and regional courts when interpreting international fair trial rights.
Article 21 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is an
improvement in this regard, as it designates the "applicable law" to be utilized
there. 29 First,judges are to look to the Statute, the Elements of Crimes, and the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence; then, "where appropriate, [to the]
applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including
the established principles of the international law of armed conflict;" and
finally, "[flailing [all] that, [to the] general principles of law derived by the
Court from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as
appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise
jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent
with this Statute and with international law and internationally recognized
norms and standards." 30 Judges "may also apply principles and rules of law as
interpreted in [the Court's] previous decisions." 3 '
Thus, the Rome Statute's provisions and the practice of the international
tribunals require these courts to aspire to the highest standards set by
international human rights treaties, customary international law, and general
principles of law.32 Policy considerations bolster this conclusion, as it would
human rights conventions, article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and
article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights), with Separate Opinion ofJudge Stephen on the
Prosecutor's Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses, The Prosecutor v.
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
Aug. 10, 1995, available at http:/lwww.un.orglictyltadicltrialc2/decision-e50810pmn.htm ("[T]he
general principle enunciated by the [European Court ofHuman Rights] ...[provides] clear guidance as
to what are internationally recognised standards regarding the rights of the accused.").
27. Decision on the Motions by the Prosecution for Protective Measures for the Prosecution
Witnesses Pseudonymed 'B" Through to "M," The Prosecution v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial
Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Apr. 28, 1997, 27, availableat
http:llwww.un.orgictylcelebiciltrialc2/decision-e/70428PM2.htm ("[D]ecisions on the provisions of the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights... and the European Convention on Human Rights
...have been found to be authoritative and applicable.").
28. Judgement, The Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. lT-95-16-T, Trial Chamber,
537-542, available at
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Jan. 14, 2000,
http:llwww.un.orglictylkupreskic/trialc2/judgementl'mdex.htm, appealdismissedinpartand allowedin
parton othergrounds, Appeal Judgement, The Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Appeals
Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 23, 2001, available at
http://www.un.orgicty/kupreskic/appeal/judgement/kup-ajOl 1023e.pdf.
29. Rome Statute, supranote 9, art 21.
30. I art. 21(1). It is unclear whether domestic case law can be considered under the Article
21(1)(c) rubric "general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of
the world."
31. Id. art. 21(2). Article 21 also provides that "[tihe application and interpretation of law
pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and be without
any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender, as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age,
race, colour, language, religion or belief political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin,
wealth, birth or other status." Id art. 21(3).
32. Accord Decision on Preliminary Motions, The Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-9937-PT, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Nov. 8, 2001, 38,
availableat http'J/www.un.orgicty/milosevicldecision-e/01 1108e.htm.
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be inconceivable that an international tribunal (especially one trying such
serious crimes) would be held less stringently to human rights norms than
national legal systems.
This is of some importance for the determination of what constitutes a
fair trial in the situations described herein, because the courts' statutes, not
surprisingly, contain lacunae and provisions that are susceptible to differing
interpretations and applications. Thus, while the statutes of all three courts
require "fair trials," and specify certain rights of the accused as well, 33 it is not
always evident from the texts what a fair trial entails or how those rights
should be applied. The Rome Statute, for instance, guarantees to the accused
the right "to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the
defence" and "to obtain the attendance and examination or witnesses on his or
her behalf., 34 No mention is made, specifically, of the right to procure
evidence, though the word "facilities" has been interpreted by one
commentator to mean "documents, records, etc. necessary for preparation of
the defence," 35 and the Statute does make provision for the accused to request
the Pre-Trial Chamber to issue orders and other measures to ensure
cooperation "necessary to assist the person in the preparation of his or her
defence., 36 No mention is made, either, of the principle of "equality of arms,"
though this, too, is assumed to be incorporated into the Rome Statute's
guarantee of a fair trial,37 in part because the ICTY has recognized it in its
own decisions. Thus, the Appeals Chamber explained in the Aleksovski case,
citing a European Court of Human Rights decision, that "each party must be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his case-including his
evidence-under conditions that do not place him at a substantial
disadvantage vis-a-vis his opponent., 38 We know, as well, from the tribunals'
statutes and case law, that judicial independence is a crucial component of a
fair trial before international criminal courts.39

33.
See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991, Art. 21, annexedto Secretary-General's Report, supra note 14, 32 I.L.M. 1159
(1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955,
annex, Art. 20, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994)
[hereinafter ICTR Statute]; Rome Statute, supranote 9, art. 67.
34. Rome Statute, supranote 9, art. 67(1)(b), (e). These provisions mirror those in the ICTY
and ICTR Statutes.
35. Schabas, supranote 16, at 855 (quoting MANFRED NowAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL
AND POLITICAL RIoHTS: ICCPR COMMENTARY 256 (1993)).

36. Rome Statute, supranote 9, art. 57(3)(b).
37. See Schabas, supra note 16, at 852.
38. Decision on Prosecutor's Appeal on Admissibility of Evidence, The Prosecutor v.
Aleksovski, Case No. 1-95-14/1-A, Appeals Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, Feb. 16, 1999,
24, available at http:l/www.un.orglictylaleksovskilappealldecision-e
90216EV36313.htm (citing Dombo BeheerB.V v. The Netherlands, 18 E.H.R.R. 213, 230 (1993)); see
also Foucher v. France, 25 E.H.R.R. 234, 247 (1997) ("[A]ccording to the principle of equality ofarms,
as one of the features of the wider concept of a fair trial, each party must be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present his case in conditions that do not place him at a disadvantage vis-i-vis his
opponent"); Bulut v. Austria, 24 E.H.R.R. 84, 103-04 (1996) (same).
39. See Judgement, The Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. 1T-95-17/1-A, Appeals Chamber,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, July 21, 2000,
177-191, available at
http://www.un.org/icty/furundzija/appeal/judgement/fur-aj000721 e.pdf.
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In model domestic judicial systems, these three procedural/structural
rights-the right to prepare a defense, equality of arms, and judicial
independence-are all more or less taken for granted. As will become evident,
in international criminal courts at present, such an assumption would be

unwarranted.
II. THE COOPERATION REGIME
Why these fair trial rights may be at risk can be appreciated by
recognizing one fact: international criminal courts are dependent on other
organizations-states, most importantly-to give them things. These thingsmoney, evidence, access to evidence, defendants, witnesses, witness
protection, court personnel, prison facilities, and the enforcement of orders
and judgments-are all necessary for the courts'
success, and, indeed, without
40
them, the courts could not operate or exist.
Though by now the two ad hoc tribunals to varying degrees have all of
the staples and thus have the look and feel of courts, international justice
requires more than just the basics.4 1 It is not enough that the ICTY and the
ICTR, for example, have modem courtrooms, first-class prosecutors, and
websites with all the works. They must also be able to get the necessities of
criminal justice (evidence, witnesses, etc.) when and where they need them,
and they must do so in ways that
42 do not compromise their integrity. The same
will be true of the future ICC.

40. See, e.g., KRISTINA MISKOWIAK, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: CONSENT,
COMPLEMENTARITY AND COOPERATION (2000); STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS,
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCrrIEs ININTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG
LEGACY 216-26 (1997); Irene Gartner, The Rules of Procedure and Evidence on Co-operation and
Enforcement, in INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 423 (Horst Fischer et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL AND
NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES]; Mary Margaret Penrose, Lest We Fail: The Importance of
Enforcement in InternationalCriminalLaw, 15 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 321 (1999); Gdran Sluiter, Co-

operation with the InternationalCriminal Tribunalsfor the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, in
INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL PROSECUTION OF CRIMES, supra, at 681; Bert Swart & Gtran Sluiter,

The InternationalCriminal Court and InternationalCriminal Cooperation,in REFLECTIONS ON THE
ICC, supra note 3, at 91. See generally DAVID McCLEAN, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE

(1992); M. CherifBassiouni PolicyConsiderationson Inter-stateCooperationin CriminalMatters,in 2
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 3 (M. CherifBassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999).
41. This is not to say that the ICTY and the ICTR are on the same footing; they are not.
Individuals, NGOs, and states have taken a greater interest in the ICTY, for a variety of reasons. This
has led, most obviously, to a marked difference in the quality of the personnel and resources available to
the two ad hoc tribunals. See Steven Edwards, Rwanda Tribunal Coming Undone: "Concernfor

Fairness":Night-and-Day Contrastwith Balkan War-CrimesInquiry, NAT'L POST (Toronto), Mar. 5,
2001, at Al.
42.
For discussions and critiques ofthe cooperation regime instituted in the Rome Statute, see

Jacob Katz Cogan, The Problemof ObtainingEvidenceforInternationalCriminalcourts,22 HUM. RTS.

Q. 404,

424-26 (2000); Hans-Peter Kaul & Claus KreB, Jurisdictionand Cooperationin the Statute of

the InternationalCriminalCourt: Principlesand Compromises,2 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 143,
157-70 (1999); Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The InternationalCriminalCourt: An Uneasy
Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 444-47 (2000); and Swart & Sluiter, supra note 40, at 681. For the
negotiating history and a review ofthe relevant provisions of the Rome Statute, see Claus Kre3 et al.,

Part9: InternationalCooperationand JudicialAssistance, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE,
supra note 16, at 1045-68; and THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: TI-IE
MAKINo OF THE ROME
STATUTE, ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 270-94, 305-17 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).
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This is a difficult proposition given the position of these courts within
the structure of the international system. The tribunals must rely on the
kindness of strangers--"international cooperation" and "judicial assistance"
are the terms of art-for all their needs. "We depend on the goodwill of the
parties," noted Christian Chartier, then-ICTY spokesperson. 43 When an
international court's jurisdiction is consensual, as in the case of the
International Court of Justice and similar tribunals, cooperation and judicial
44
assistance problems are significantly reduced, though not eliminated.
International criminal tribunals, in contrast, deal, by definition, with nonconsensual parties (be they the person under indictment, the accused's country
of origin, or third-parties that have information relevant to the case),45 and, in
spite of various statutory obligations,46 those parties are likely to be less
inclined47to cooperate willingly or fully, for the best or for the worst of
reasons.

It is not just the recalcitrance of interested states that hampers
international criminal courts; the very statutes and rules that created these
courts also restrict their operation. Take, for example, the ICTY Statute.
Article 29 provides that "States shall co-operate with the International
Tribunal in the investigation and prosecution of persons accused of
committing serious violations of international humanitarian law., 48 This
article is binding on states, the ICTY being a creation of the Security Council
pursuant to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. But the ICTY's rules curtail the
Article 29 obligation by creating loopholes for national security information
(Rule 54bis) and materials provided to the court on a confidential basis (Rule
70). 49 Thus, states can restrict and tailor their cooperation while upholding
their Charter obligations. The same "give-with-one-hand-and-take-with-theother" structure pervades the Rome Statute and its Rules. 50 Indeed, it was only
43.
Quoted in Mark Rice-Oxley, TribunalDepends on the Kindness ofFoes,NAT'L L.J., June
3, 1996, at A10.
44.
Cf. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 32 (Apr. 9) ("[Certain documents]
were not produced, the Agent pleading naval secrecy; and the United Kingdom witnesses declined to
answer certain questions relating to them. It is not therefore possible to know the real content of these
naval orders.").
45. This is true even if, in the case of the International Criminal Court, the state is a state party
to the Rome Statute. On defiance ofthe ICTY, see Richard J. Goldstone & Gary Jonathan Bass, Lessons
from the InternationalCriminalTribunals,in THE UNrrED STATES AND THE ICC, supranote 8, at 51, 5657.
46. See infranotes 48-50.
47. For an example of domestic legal impediments to cooperation, see In re Ntakirutimana,
No. CIV. A. L-98-43, 1998 WL 655708 (S.D. Tex. 1998), aff'd sub nom. Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184
F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1135 (2000); and In re Ntakirutimana,988 F. Supp.
1038 (S.D. Tex. 1997). See also Goran Sluiter, To Cooperateor Not to Cooperate? The Case of the
FailedTransfer of Ntakirutimana to the Rwanda Tribunal, 11 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 383 (1998). For a
discussion of implementing legislation and international cooperation, see Bruce Broomhall, The
International Criminal Court: Overview, and Cooperation with States, in ICC RATIFICATION AND
NATIONAL IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION 44 (1999); and Goran Sluiter, Obtaining Evidence for the
InternationalCriminalTribunalfor the FormerYugoslavia: An Overview and Assessment ofDomestic
Implementing Legislation,45 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 87 (1998).

48. ICTY Statute, supranote 33, art. 29; accordICTR Statute, supranote 33, art. 28.
49. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia: Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, Rules 54bis, 70, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.21 (2001); accordInternational Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda: Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rules 56, 70, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev.10 (2001).
50. See Rome Statute, supranote 9, pt. 9; Finalized Draft Text ofthe Rules ofProcedure and
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with these enfeebling concessions that states were willing to accede to the
"binding obligation" to cooperate with the ad hoc tribunals and the future
ICC. It is the Catch-22 that is at the heart of international criminal justice.
For the post-World War II criminal tribunals, cooperation was less of an
issue because the Allies' victory and political will secured access to the
relevant evidence and witnesses. 1 Contemporary tribunals differ in this
critical respect. 52 The importance of international cooperation for the
continued existence of international criminal courts is evident in the debate
over U.S. ratification of the Rome Statute. Advocates of the ICC know that it
is crucial that the United States, with its diplomatic, intelligence, and military
resources, be willing to assist the Court, even if it refuses to ratify the Statute.
Anti-Court activists, for the same reason, have pushed legislation that would
prohibit the United States from giving such assistance.5 3 Without cooperation,
particularly U.S. cooperation, international criminal courts, in the words of
Judge Antonio Cassese, "turn out to be utterly impotent."54
Commentators are well aware of the difficulties the cooperation regime
creates for effective prosecutions; less appreciated is how the same problems
affect the rights of the accused. Discussed below are two types of examples
drawn from the experiences of the ad hoc tribunals that involve the fair trial
rights noted above: restrictions on the ability of the accused to mount a
defense, and political influence of states on the work of these courts.
IV. DIFFICULTIES: LIMITATIONS ON THE DEFENSE

In several ways, the cooperation regime limits the ability of the accused
to gain access to the materials that might be necessary to put on a reasonable
defense. These limitations, which do not weigh equally on the prosecution,

Evidence, ch. 11, U.N. Doc. PCNICCI2000IIAdd.1 (2000).
51. See, e.g., GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNALS 204 (2000); ARNOLD C. BRACKMAN, THE OTHER NUREMBERG: THEUNTOLD STORY
OF THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRiALs 57-58, 60 (1987); JOHN W. DOWER, EMBRACING DEFEAT: JAPAN IN
THE WAKE OF WORLD WAR II 450 (1999); MINOW, supra note 6, at 48; PHILIP R. PICCIGALLO, THE
JAPANESE ON TRIAL: ALLID WAR CRMES OPERATIOiNS rN THE EAST, 1945-195 1, at 41, 45 (1979); M.
CherifBassiouni, The Sourcesand ContentofInternationalCriminalLaw: A TheoreticalFramework,in
1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMNAL LAW 3, 6-7 (M. CherifBassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999); cf.Kenneth Anderson,
NurembergSensibility: Telford Taylor's Memoir of the Nuremberg Trials, 7 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 281,
293 (1994) (book review) ("[Tlhose who want to imitate Nuremberg in Yugoslavia have deeply
mistaken what the Nuremberg trial was all about.").
52. Accord James Blount Griffin, Note, A Predictive Framework for the Effectiveness of
InternationalCriminalTribunals,34 VAND. J. TRANsNAT'L L. 405 (2001).
53. See An Act Making Appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State,
the Judiciary, and Related Agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-77,
§ 630 (2001); American Servicemembers' Protection Act of2001, H.R. 1794/S. 857, 107th Cong. §§ 47 (2001). But cf.American Citizens' Protection and War Criminal Prosecution Act of 2001, S.1296,
107th Cong. § 7 (2001) ("Notwithstanding any other law, while the United States is not a party to the
Rome Statute, the United States may provide support and assistance, as appropriate, on a case-by-case
basis to the International Criminal Court for the prosecution of accused war criminals, particularly those
accused of crimes against United States servicemembers, United States citizens, or citizens of countries
friendly to, or allied with, the United States when the President determines that doing so would serve
important United States interests.").
54. Antonio Cassese, Reflections on InternationalCriminalJustice, 61 MOD. L. REv. 1, 10
(1998).
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skew international criminal trials against the defendant in ways that can
infringe upon the fundamental fairness of the proceedings.
A.

Evidence Gathering:Blaskic

Take evidence gathering and the case of Tihomir Blaskic. 55 Blaskic is a
Bosnian Croat who was a colonel and then a general in the Croatian Defense
Council (HVO), the Bosnian Croat army, during the Bosnian war. In the
spring of 1993, Croat forces in central Bosnia attempted to rid the area of nonCroats, and in what came to be called ethnic cleansing, massacred hundreds of
Muslim civilians in the Lasva Valley-most infamously in the village of
Ahmici. Blaskic was the commander of the HVO's Central Bosnia Operative
Zone at the time. Subsequently, in 1995, he was indicted by the ICTY, under
the theory of command responsibility, of crimes against humanity, grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and war crimes. Blaskic
surrendered himself to the Tribunal in 1996, and, after a long trial, he was
convicted and sentenced to forty-five years imprisonment on March 3, 2000.56
Days later, Croatian authorities
announced that they had found documents that
57
would exonerate him.
That these new, perhaps exculpating, documents appeared when they
did, or that they appeared at all, was simply fortuitous-the lucky result of
one man's demise. Under the presidency of Franjo Tudjman, Croatia had
spumed repeated requests for cooperation from the ICTY. Indeed, the ICTY's
most important judicial decision on state cooperation resulted from Tudjman's
refusal to accede to a subpoena during the Blaskic trial itself, which might
have revealed these documents. 58 That changed with Tudjman's death in
December 1999 and the election of a new coalition government, headed by the
Social Democratic Party and the Croatian Social Liberal Party, early in
2000. 59 That spring, just as the Blaskic verdict was handed down, Croatian
authorities began searching the archives of the Croatian Information Service
55.
My preliminary thoughts on this issue, up through the trial and sentencing of Tihomir
Blaskic, appear in Cogan, supra note 42, at 404. The discussion here extends the story into the appeals
stage of the Blaskic case.
56. See Judgement, The Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Chamber,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Mar. 3, 2000, available at
http://www.un.org/icty/blaskic/trialcl/judgement/bla-tj000303e.pdf.
57. Ivica Racan, the Croatian prime minister, said: "A few days ago we came upon extensive
documents related to the war in Bosnia which shed new light on the events raised at Blaskic's trial
before the tribunal in The Hague." ICTY Expects Croatiato Cooperate, GLOBAL NEWS WiRE, Mar. 8,
2000, availableat LEXIS, News Library, GNW File.
58. See The Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Chamber, International
Criminal
Tribunal
for the
Yugoslavia,
Former
29,
Oct.
1997,
available at
http://www.un.orglicty/blaskic/appealldecision-e/71029JT3.html
[hereinafter
Blaskic Subpoena
Decision]. For a discussion, see Cogan, supra note 42, at 415-23; Peter Malanczuk, A Note on the
Judgement of the Appeals Chamberof the InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia
on the Issuance of Subpoenae Duces Tecum in the Blaskic Case, I Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 229
(1998); and Yves Nouvel, Pricisionssur le pourvoir du Tribunalpour l'ex-Yugoslavie d'ordonnerla
production des preuves et la comparutiondes tdmoins L "Arritde la Chambred'appel du 29 octobre
1997dans l'affaireBlaskic, 102 REVUE G NRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 157 (1998).
59.
See Croatia Vows to Cooperate with Tribunal, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2000, at A14;
CroatianParliamentBacks Cooperationwith UN War CrimesTribunal,AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Apr.
15, 2000, available at 2000 WL 2774533; see also Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can
InternationalCriminalJustice Prevent FutureAtrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 7, 19-22 (2001).
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and Tudjman's presidential palace. There they found an archive of war that
stretched back years and years. "We have [until now] tried unsuccessfully to
gain access to government archives," Anto Nobilo, one of Blaskic's attorneys,
noted at the time.60 Croatia soon handed over many, bit by no means all, of
the documents to the Tribunal, including transcripts of taped conversations
Tudjman had with his top generals about the events in the Lasva Valley.61
According to Blaskic's defenders, the documents show that he was
framed by Tudjman and other Croatian political elites for the crimes
committed in Ahmici so as to divert suspicion from the real culprits-the
Croatian political operatives who gave the orders, the Bosnian Croat political
leadership who supervised the killings and other crimes, and the Bosnian
Croat "military police" who committed the atrocities.62 In other words, if all
of this is true, then Blaskic neither gave the orders to commit the massacre nor
failed to give orders to prevent the slaughter that took place in Ahmici, and
thus should not be held responsible for those events, as he was at trial.63
Blaskic's appeal is pending,64 and it may be that the Appeals Chamber
reviewing the Trial Chamber judgment in light of the new evidence will
exonerate Blaskic, reduce his sentence, or order that he be re-tried.65
Even if his appeal fails, Blaskic's case demonstrates the inherent
constraints on the accused in putting on a defense before international
60. Eugene Brcic, New War Crime Case Evidence Found, AP ONLINE, Mar. 6, 2000,
availableat2000 WL 15786528.
61. See Constitution Watch: Croatia,E. EUR. CON. REV., Summer 2000, at 10, 10-12. In
January 2001, the Croatian government announced its intention to seal the unreleased tapes and
transcripts of Tudjman's conversations with his aides for thirty years. Carla Del Ponte, the Chief
Prosecutor of the ICTY, had sought uninhibited access to the tapes because they might reveal evidence
relevant to ongoing and future investigations, including, potentially, investigations that would implicate
top Croatian officials, some now considered war heroes, and others still active in politics and in the
military, of committing or covering-up war crimes. The Croatian government did say that it would allow
access to the tapes on a case-by-case basis. See UN Court Requests Controversial Tapes, AP
WORLDSTREAK Jan. 8, 2001; Eugene Breic, Croatiato Seal Tudman Tapes, AP ONLNE, Jan. 11, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 3651585; see also Croatia'sPM Admits Problems in Cooperation with ICTY,
AGENCEFRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 11, 2000, availableat 2000 WL 24779139.
62. See Chris Stephen, British Officers "Clear" Bosnian War Criminal, SCOTLAND ON
SUNDAY (Edinburgh), Apr. 9, 2000, availableat 2000 WL 4011654; Del Ponte in Croatiaamid Fresh
Claims over War Crimes Suspects, AGENCE FRANcE-PRESSE, May 24, 2000, available at 2000 WL
2800630; Paul Lashmar, Cabell Bruce & John Cookson, The Tudjman Tapes: Secret RecordingsLink
DeadDictatorto BosniaCrimes,INDEPENDENT (London), Nov. 1, 2000, at 16.
63.
One of the politicians who apparently was in the direct chain of command was Dario
Kordic, vice-president of the Bosnian Croat state during the war. Kordic was convicted recently in The
Hague as a co-perpetrator, rather than under the theory of command responsibility. See Judgement, The
Prosecutor v. Kordic , Case No. IT-95-14/2, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, Feb. 26, 2001,
829, 834, 840-41, available at http://www.un.orgicty/kordie
triale/judgement/kor-tj010226e.pdf; see also Marlise Simons, UN Tribunal Convicts Bosnian Croat
Leader; Tudman Ally is Handed 25-Year Sentence, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 27, 2001, at 5. Croatia has
arrested and has issued arrest warrants for the persons who are now suspected of committing the Ahmici
massacre. See Snjezana Vukic, CroatiaArrests War Crime Suspects, AP ONLINE, Sept. 12, 2000,
availableat2000 WI. 26674877.
64. Because the new documents must be translated, and because there are so many of them,
the Appeals Chamber has suspended the usual briefing schedule. No argument date has yet been set. See
Decision on the Appellant's Motions for the Production of Material, Suspension or Extension of the
Briefing Schedule, and Additional Findings, The Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals
Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Sept. 26, 2000, available at
http:llwww.un.orglictyblaskiclappealldecision-etOO926PN313780.htm.
65. See Kupreskic, supranote 28, pt. X.

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 27: 111

criminal courts. Evidence necessary to prove innocence or to assert a legal
defense may be beyond the reach of the court, either because of the court's
inability to successfully coerce the evidence-holder or because the evidenceholder deliberately seeks to influence the outcome of the trial by manipulating
the release of probative information.66
B.

Evidence Gathering:Todorovic

The Todorovic case provides another example of the difficulties of
cooperation in the area of evidence gathering. Stevan Todorovic is a Bosnian
Serb from Donja Slatina in the municipality of Bosanski Samac in northern
Bosnia.67 According to Tribunal prosecutors, Todorovic was appointed the
Chief of Police for Bosanski Samac after Serb forces occupied that area in
April 1992.68 A 1995 ICTY indictment alleged that, in this capacity,
Todorovic, together with four others charged in the same indictment,
"committed, planned, instigated, ordered or otherwise aided and abetted a
campaign of persecutions and 'ethnic cleansing' and committed other serious
violations of international humanitarian law directed against Bosnian Croat,
Bosnian Muslim and other non-Serb civilians residing in the Bosanski Samac
and Odzak municipalities in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina." 69 In
particular, Todorovic was charged with twenty-seven counts of war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of
1949, for acts, by his own hand or by virtue of his superior authority, of
persecution (including detention and forced deportation), murder, beating,
torture, and sexual assault, which allegedly took place from April 1992
through December 1993.70 Todorovic was arrested by the multinational
"stabilization force" in Bosnia (SFOR) at the Tuzla Air Force Base on
September 27, 1998, and transferred to The Hague for trial.
Ever since, Todorovic has claimed that he had been kidnapped from his
home in Serbia by bounty hunters hired by SFOR (perhaps even in accord
with the ICTY's Office of the Prosecutor)7 1 and then taken across the border
into Bosnia where SFOR arrested him. 72 This, he said, was an illegal form of
66. Accord Alfred P. Rubin, The InternationalCriminal Court:Possibilitiesfor Prosecutorial
Abuse, 64 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 153, 161 (2001).
67. See Second Amended Indictment, The Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 17, available at http:lwww.un.orgictyl
indictment/english/sim-2ai98121 le.htm.
68. Id
69. Id 13.
70. Id.
29-47.
71.
Todorovic's testimony in regards to his kidnaping was given on November 24, 1999, and
a transcript thereof is available. See http:l/www.un.orglicty/transe9/991124MH.htm. In December 2000,
a Serbian court convicted nine Serbs of abducting Todorovic in exchange for $22,700. See Katarina
Kratovac, Nine Serbs Convicted of Kidnapping,AP ONLINE, Dec. 11, 2000, available at 2000 WL
30321027. The nine men's sentences ranged from six months to eight-and-a-half years. See Nine Who
Handed Over Bosnian Warcrimes Suspect Sent to Jail, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 11, 2000,
availableat 2000 WL 24779222.
72. Dragan Nikolic, another ICTY defendant, has made a similar claim, which is being
litigated presently. See Mirko Klarin, The Tribunal's "IllegalDetention," IWPR TRIBUNAL UPDATE
222, May 21-26, 2001, available at http://www.iwpr.netindex.pl?archive/tri/tri 222_1_eng.txt; Misha
Savic, Lawyer Disputes Bosnian Serb Arrest, AP ONLINE, May 6, 2006, available at 2000 WL
19888475; Jerome Socolovsky, War Crime Suspects Claiming Illegal Abductions: Eichmann Case
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apprehension under international law, and on October 21, 1999, he filed a
"Motion for an order directing the Prosecutor to forthwith return [him] to the
country of refuge." 73 On November 24, 1999, Todorovic filed a "notice of

Motion for Judicial Assistance," which sought information, including
documents and testimony, from SFOR and other military forces operating in
Bosnia, which he hoped to use as evidence in support of his October 21
motion.74 Also for the same purpose, Todorovic, on December 6, 1999,
submitted a motion to compel the Prosecutor to produce certain relevant
documents. Three months later, on March 7, 2000, the Trial Chamber, hoping
to avoid ruling on Todorovic's politically delicate request for assistance from
SFOR, granted the much less controversial December 6 motion, and the
Tribunal's Appeals Chamber affirmed this ruling.75 The Office of the
Prosecutor, however, lacked nearly all of the documents requested;
additionally, SFOR refused to hand over any information voluntarily. Briefs
were then submitted on Todorovic's still-pending request for documents from
SFOR, and oral argument was held July 25, 2000.76 On October 18, 2000, the
Trial Chamber granted Todorovic's motion for judicial assistance 77 and
Studied, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Aug. 5, 2000, at 23A73. Whether such a scheme does violate international law and whether the accused's return to
his country of origin would be an appropriate remedy for such a violation are difficult issues and have
not been decided by the ICTY or the ICTR. There are some decisions, such as the Eichmann and
Alvarez-Machaincases, on point. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); AttorneyGeneral v. Eichmann, 45 P.M. 3 (1965), 36 I.L.R. 5, 233 (D.C. Jm. 1961), aff'd 16 P.D. 2003, 36 I.L.R.
277 (S.Ct. 1962) (Isr.). One ICTY Trial Chamber has decided that surreptitiously "luring" a person to a
location where he was then arrested did not violate the statute. See Decision on the Motion for Release
by the Accused Slavko Dokmanovic, The Prosecutor v. Dokmanovic, Case No. IT-1995-13a-PT, Trial
Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 22, 1997, 88. The Appeals
Chamber denied Dokmanovic leave to appeal this decision.
74. These motions were made before, in March 1999, and were rejected, without prejudice, by
the Trial Chamber because Todorovic had failed to offer prima facie evidence of his abduction. See
Decision Stating Reasons for Trial Chamber's Order of 4 March 1999 on Defence Motion for
Evidentiary Hearing on the Arrest ofthe Accused Todorovic, The Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-959, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Mar. 25, 1999, available
at http'/www.un.orgictylsimic/trialc3/decision-e/90325MS56368.htm
see also Transcript of
Proceedings, The Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9, Trial Chamber, International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Mar. 4, 1999, available at http://www.un.orgicty/
transe9/990304MHhtm. Subsequently, the Appeals Chamber affirmed the Trial Chamber's
interpretation ofthe burden of proof on this issue. See Decision on Appeal by Stevan Todorovic Against
the Oral Decision of 4 March 1999 and the Written Decision of 25 March 1999 of Trial Chamber IK
The Prosecutor v. Todorovic, Case No. T-95-9, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 13, 1999, available at http:llwww.un.orgicty/simiclappealldecision-el
910137239576.htm.
75. See Order on Defence Requests for Judicial Assistance for the Production of Information,
The Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, Mar. 7, 2000, available at http:llwww.un.orglicty/simieltrialc3/ordere/00307PN511789.htm; Decision on Application for Leave to Appeal Against Trial Chamber Decision
of 7 March 2000, The Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9, Appeals Chamber, International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, May 3, 2000, available at http:I/www.un.orglicty/simiclappeall
decision-el00503DE312854.htm.
76. For a transcript of this argument, see Transcript ofthe Argument,The Prosecutor v. Simic,
July 25, 2000, at 746, availableathttp:llwww.un.orgicty/transe9/000725MH.htm.
77. See Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be Provided by SFOR and Others, The
Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia,
Oct. 18,
2000, available at http:llwww.un.orglicty/simicltrialc3/decision-el
01018EV513778.htm. The Trial Chamber's decision was based on an application of the Blaskic
Subpoena Decision,supranote 58, and analogous decisions of other ICTY trial chambers. See Decision
on Defence Motion to Issue Subpoena to United Nations Secretariat, The Prosecutor v. Kovacevic, Case
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ordered SFOR, the North Atlantic Council, and the states participating in
SFOR to provide documents related to Todorovic's apprehension. The Trial
Chamber also issued a subpoena to U.S. General Eric Shinseki, who was the
commanding general of the Tuzla base when Todorovic was apprehended,
requiring him to testify about Todorovic's arrest.78
The importance of the Trial Chamber's decision for its ability to conduct
fair trials was spelled out in Judge Patrick Robinson's separate opinion:
No legal system, whether international or domestic, that is based on the rule of law, can
countenance the prospect of a person being deprived of his liberty, while its tribunals or
courts remain powerless to require the detaining or arresting authority to produce, in
proceedings challenging the legality of the arrest, material relevant to the detention or
arrest; in such a situation,
legitimate questions may be raised about the independence of
79
those judicial bodies.

Judge Robinson's logic, however, failed to convince the ICTY's
Prosecutor and the states subject to the Trial Chamber's orders. On October
25, 2000, the Prosecutor filed an appeal, and on November 2, Canada,
Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, NATO, Norway, the United
Kingdom, and the United States filed requests for review of the Trial
Chamber's decision. A few days later, on November 6, France did the same.
On November 8, the ICTY's Appeals Chamber stayed the Trial Chamber's
orders and scheduled dates for written submissions and oral argument, the
latter of which was eventually postponed until January 10, 2001.8" The United
States, in its legal brief, asserted that the Tribunal did not have the ability to
summon General Shinseki and that, in any case, "compelling operation
security concerns" precluded disclosure.8 1 The brief also told the judges, not
so subtly, that their decision "will be of utmost significance to the future of
the tribunal, and its relationship with those engaged in the apprehension of
persons indicted for war crimes.' 82
Before the Appeals Chamber could hear the appeal, Todorovic, on
December 13, 2000, formally entered into a plea bargain with tribunal
prosecutors.83 According to the plea, prosecutors agreed to withdraw twentyNo. IT-97-24, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, July 1, 1998,
available at http:l/www.un.orgictylkovacevic/trialc2/decision-e80701SP2.htm Decision on Ex Parte
Application for the Issuance of an Order to the European Community Monitoring Mission, The
Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, May 3, 2000, available at http://www.un.org/icty/kordic/trialc/decision-e/
00503PN513632.htm; Decision Refusing Defence Motion for Subpoena, The Prosecutor v. Kovacevic,
Case No. IT-97-24, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, June 23,
1998, availableat http://www.un.org/icty/kovacevictrialc2/decision-e/80623SP2.htm.
78. See Jerome Socolovsky, Tribunal Subpoenas NATO Gen., AP ONLINE, Oct. 20, 2000,
availableat2000 WL 28614085.
79. Separate Opinion of Judge Robinson, Decision on Motion for Judicial Assistance to be
Provided by SFOR and Others, The Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9, Trial Chamber, International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 18, 2000,
7, available at
http:lwww.un.orglictylsimicltrialc3/decision-el0018EVT13779.htm.
80. See Decision and Scheduling Order, The Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9, Appeals
Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 18, 2000, available at
http:lwww.un.orglicty/simiclappealdecision-e1 108JA314063.htm.
81.
See Jerome Socolovsky, U.S. Opposes Tribunal's Subpoena, AP ONLINE, Dec. 6, 2000,
availableat2000 WL 30319246.
82. Id (quoting the U.S. brief).
83. See Jerome Socolovsky, Bosnian Serb Suspect PleadsGuilty, AP ONLINE, Dec. 13, 2000,
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six of the twenty-seven counts filed and Todorovic agreed to plead guilty to
the remaining count-that of persecution, a crime against humanity-and to

withdraw all of his outstanding motions, including those for judicial
assistance.84 Prosecutors also agreed to recommend a sentence of no more
than twelve-years imprisonment, instead of the life sentence allowable under

the Tribunal's statute.85 Deputy Chief Prosecutor Graham Blewitt said, rather

unconvincingly, that "[a]bsolutely nothing has been sacrificed. 86 But Blewitt
acknowledged that there had been a recent decline in the number of arrests by
SFOR and that "[he] would not be surprised if [the Todorovic case] had
something to do with it.",87 Unlike in Blaskic, the detrimental consequences of
a defendant's inability to secure evidence did not fully materialize in the
Todorovic case, but the lesson is just as valid.
C.

Evidence Gathering:Lockerbie
Blaslic and Todorovic demonstrate the impact of non-cooperation on the

possibility ofconducting fair trials for international criminal courts. Though in
a Scottish court in The Netherlands, not in an international court, strictly
speaking, the recent Lockerbie trial presents a variation of the difficulties of
evidence gathering: partial cooperation. In Lockerbie, a Libyan Central
Intelligence Agency
double agent named Abdul Majid Giaka was the Crown's
8
star witness. He promised to link the two accused to the bomb that blew up
Pan Am 103. For ten years, the CIA refused to release classified cables
regarding its relationship with Giaka. In June 2000, a month after the trial
began, the CIA allowed the prosecution to see twenty-five of these cables, but
the defense only received redacted copies. 89 In August, the defense learned of
the discrepancy and demanded that it, too, receive the unedited versions. 90 The
available at 2000 WL 30832710. The plea agreement was made at the end ofNovember and had been
kept confidential.
84. Id
85. Id
86. Id An ICTY Trial Chamber accepted the guilty plea at a hearing on January 19, 2001. See
Press Release, Todorovic Case: Guilty Plea Accepted by Trial Chamber, XT/P.I.S./556-e, International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Jan. 19, 2001, available at http://www.un.orgicty/
pressreal/p556-e.htm. On February 26, 2001, this same Trial Chamber accepted the prosecution's
motion to withdraw the remaining counts against Todorovic and Todorovic's motion to withdraw all
pending motions filed by the defense. See Sentencing Judgement, The Prosecutor v. Todorovic, Case
No. IT-95-9/1-S, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, July 31,
2001,
8, available at http:llwww.un.orglicty/todorovicljudgementltod-tjO0731e.pdf
On July 31,
2001, he was sentenced to ten years imprisonment. Id 117.
87. Todorovic Case: In a Sensational New Twist, Stevan Todorovic Pleads Guilty to
Persecution Charges, IWPR TRMUNAL UPDATE, Dec.
11-16, 2000, available at

http://www.iwpr.netindex.pl?archiveltri/tri2031_eng.txt (quoting Graham Blewitt).
88. The facts recounted here are based on Herve Clere, CIA Accused of Withholding
Informationfrom Lockerbie Trial, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Sept. 21, 2000, available at 2000 WL
24716350; DoubleAgent to Face Court,HERALD (Glasgow), Sept. 22, 2000, at 12; Peter Ford, Doubts
About Key Lockerbie Witness, CHRISTAN SCi. MoNIToR, Sept. 5, 2000, at 8; Gerard Seenan, Doubts
over CrucialLockerbie Witness: CIA Cables Threaten ProsecutionCase that Relies on Evidence from
Libyan DoubleAgent Who Worked with Accused, GUARDIAN (London), Aug. 31, 2000, at 11.
89. Apparently, the Crown wanted the cables so that it could refresh Giaka's recollection
when he took the witness stand.
90. The defense based its request on decisions from the European Court of Human Rights
requiring that the defendant and the prosecution have "equality of arms." See supra notes 36-38 and
accompanying text.
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prosecution said that the blacked-out portions of the cables were of no
relevance and that, in any event, national security concerns prevented their
full release.But the Scottish court granted the defense's request and, for the
first time in its history, the CIA provided a foreign court with classified
documents. The unexpurgated cables showed that Giaka's handlers had
serious doubts about his veracity and that it was only after the CIA threatened
to take him off the payroll that he revealed any information about the
Lockerbie bombing. With this information in hand, defense counsel requested
all other U.S. classified documents that pertained to Giaka, and the court
adjourned for the first three weeks of September to allow the CIA to decide
whether it would provide the additional materials. The CIA provided an
additional 36 cables, some of which cast doubt on the prosecution's
allegations. The defense then made an additional request for any CIA
materials relevant to the bombing, but the court rejected this bid. William
Taylor, counsel for one of the accused, noted that "[it] is alarming for the
prospects of this trial being construed by third parties as a fair trial when
external sources [namely, the CIA] have dissembled in relation to certain
evidence."91 His co-counsel, Richard Keen, referring to the defense's theory
that the Pan Am 103 bombing was committed by Palestinian terrorists and not
the two Libyans on trial, noted that "[t]he CIA had a very material part in the
investigation of this disaster, it does have evidence and production of that
evidence to date has ...been tailored [to implicate the two accused]."92 On
January 31, 2001, the Scottish court found one of the two defendants guilty
and the other not guilty.93 We will not know whether the CIA's partial
cooperation with the Scottish tribunal had an impact on the verdicts. It is
predictable, though, that by virtue of its mission, what the CIA knows will
likely be of some importance to many international criminal trials, and
consequently, that this issue will recur.94
D.

Witness Protection

What is true of evidence gathering applies equally to the procurement of
witness testimony.One of these similarities is the danger of state manipulation
of witnesses. In January 2000, for example, Milan Vujin, one of Dusko
Tactic's attorneys, was found in contempt of court for directing witness
testimony so as not to reveal the culpability of Bosnian Serb and Yugoslav
higher-ups.95 This lent credence to the belief that some were attempting to
manipulate the proceedings in The Hague.96 Another similarity is the potential
unequal access to information.Tactic's inability to gain access to witnesses in
91. Double Agent to Face Court, supra note 88.
92. Id
93. See Donald G. McNeil Jr., Verdict's Reasoning, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2001, at A9.
94. See, e.g., Roy Gutman, What Did the CIA Know?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 27, 2001, at 30 ("The
information the United States possesses is relevant to establishing General Gotovina's innocence.")
(quoting Luka Misetic, attorney for indicted Croatian General Ante Gotovina).
95. See Judgement on Allegations of Contempt Against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, The
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeals Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Jan.
31, 2000, available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/vujin-e/index.htm.
96. See Jerome Socolovsky, Belgrade Lawyer Found in Contempt, AP ONLINE, Jan. 31, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 12386401.
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the Republika Srpska, which refused to cooperate with the defense, compared
with the Prosecutor's ability to bring in its witnesses, who were mainly
persons now residing in Western Europe and North America, served as one of
the grounds of the appeal of his conviction. According to counsel for Tadic,
"the lack of cooperation displayed by the authorities in the Republika Srpska
had a disproportionate impact on the Defence .... [And accordingly] there
was no 'equality of arms' between the Prosecution and the Defence at trial..
[T]he effect of this lack of cooperation was serious enough to frustrate
[Tadic's] right to a fair trial. 97 Though the Appeals Chamber recognized the
problem, stating that "[it could] conceive of situations where a fair trial is not
possible because witnesses central to the defence case do not appear due to the
obstructionist efforts of a State," 98 it rejected Tadic's appeal. 99 The same
problems exist in Rwanda, where defense counsel have complained for some
time about unequal access to and improper governmental tampering with
witnesses. 10 0
There are additional complications, still, when it comes to witnesses.
Prosecutors and defense counsel not only need to gain access to witnesses, as
in Tadic and Todorovic, they need also be able to provide witnesses-persons
who often still live in territory marked by violence-with necessary
protection, especially anonymity. For this, again, international criminal courts
depend on states. What happens when a court gives such protection, but is
unable to enforce it?
In November 2000, for instance, two newspapers in Croatia published
excerpts from testimony of a witness in the Blaskic case who had been given
protective measures, thereby violating the ICTY's orders. On December 1,the
Blaskic Trial Chamber issued an "Order for the Immediate Cessation of
Violations of Protective Measures for Witnesses," which required that "the
publication of statements or testimonies of the witness concerned, and
generally, of any protected witness, shall cease immediately."'' Failure to do
so, the Court pronounced, "shall expose [the publication's] author(s) and those
responsible to be found in contempt of the Tribunal.' 0,12 Without a police
force of its own, 10 3 or any authority to conduct investigations in Croatia, the
97. See The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Appeals Chamber, International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, July 15, 1999, 29, available at http:llwww.un.orgietyl
tadic/appealljudgement/ [hereinafter Tadic Appeal]; see also Opening Statement of Michail
Wladimiroff Counsel for Dusko Tadic, The Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber,
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, May 7, 1996, at 54-59, 63-65, availableat

http:llwww.un.org/ictyltransel/9605071T.htm; MIcHAEL P. ScHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY
BEHIND THE FIRST bTENATONAL WAR CRIMES TRIAL SiNcE NtJREMBERG 176 (1997); War Crimes
Tribunals: The Record and the Prospects: The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
1441 (1998) (comments ofMichall Wladimiroff).
98. TadicAppeal, supranote 97,
55-56.
99. Id 56.
100. See Isabel Vincent, CanadianLawyers Say Hands Tied in Arusha, NAT'L POST, July 28,

2001, at B1.
101. See Order for the Immediate Cessation of Violations of Protective Measures for
Witnesses, The Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Trial Chamber, International Criminal

Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Dec. 1, 2000, available at http:llwww.un.orglictylblaskic/trialell
order-e/01201PM014337.htm [hereinafter Basldc Order].
102. Id
103. See Major Christopher M. Supernor, InternationalBounty Hunters for War Criminals:
Privatizingthe EnforcementofJustice, 50 A.F. L. REv. 215, 215 (2001).
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Court requested that the authorities in Croatia "take immediately all measures
necessary to bring the publication of the Statements to an end and to provide
the Chamber with all and any information regarding the sources or authors of
the unauthorised disclosure of the Statements." 0 4 The Court also asked the
Croatian authorities to provide it with any information "regarding the identity
of those potentially responsible for the illegal disclosure of the Statements and
violations of the related orders and decisions of the Chamber regarding the
protection of witnesses."105 Though, in this case, the Croatian authorities
might be inclined to enforce the Tribunal's order-the protected witness
allegedly is the current President of Croatia, Stjepan Mesic-it is easy to
imagine cases where the local authorities would be less interested, or where
the local government is simply dysfunctional and unable to comply. 10 6 With
witnesses' lives at stake (a number have been killed or threatened), 10 7 the
incapacity of international criminal courts to guarantee the efficacy of their
protective orders has potential negative effects on the ability of defendants to
present witnesses at trial.
E.

Enforcement

Finally, what if Croatia fails to enforce the Blaskic Trial Chamber's
order against the two newspapers, as it did when this same Trial Chamber
issued a binding order against Croatia during the Blaskic trial? 10 8 What
methods does the Court then have to enforce its own orders? A variety of
methods are possible (for example, condemnation by the Security Council or
individual states, financial incentives or disincentives, diplomatic and
economic sanctions, and the use of force), 10 9 but here too the tribunals must
rely on states." 0 And in doing so, they must, as Justice Goldstone has noted,
"only rely on the media and public opinion to increase pressure ... on those
parties to act in a manner consistent with justice and morality.""' Sometimes
states find it in their interest to exert influence on noncooperating states and
this will often have an effect. Croatia's recent move toward cooperation with
the ICTY, for example, is attributable in significant part to its eagerness to
become integrated into the European economy; so too is Yugoslavia's thus far

104. Blaskic Order,supra note 101.
105. Id
106. For a recount of the leaks, see Newspapers Risk Contempt of Court Charges: Croatian
Newspapers Warned to Halt Publication of Mesic Statements, IWPR TRIBUNAL UPDATE, Dec. 4-9,
2000, availableat http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/tri/tri-202-4_eng.txt.
107. See, e.g., Carlotta Gall, A Croat'sKilling ProdsAction on War Atrocities, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 17, 2000, at 3.
108. See supranote 58 and accompanying text.
109. These are discussed in Michael P. Scharf, The Toolsfor EnforcingInternationalCriminal
Justice in the New Millennium: Lessonsfrom the Yugoslavia Tribunal,49 DEPAuL L. REV. 925, 933-37
(2000) [hereinafter Toolsfor EnforcingInternationalCriminalJustice];see also Christopher C. Joyner,
StrengtheningEnforcement ofHumanitarianLaw: Reflections on the InternationalCriminalTribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 79 (1995).
110. For a discussion of remedies for noncompliance in the context of an order to produce
documents in the Blaskic case, see Cogan, supranote 42, at 421 n.92.
111. Cedric Thornberry, Saving the War Crimes Tribunal,FoREIGN PoL'Y, Fall 1996, at 83
(quoting Justice Richard Goldstone).
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more limited cooperation following the fall of Milosevic. n 2 Still, what
happens when the states that are relied upon to enforce ICTY orders (such as
the United States) are themselves the noncompliant parties, as might have
been the case if Todorovic had not been settled? Who enforces orders against
the enforcers? In these situations, international criminal courts will likely do
what other international tribunals often do: avoid issuing an order that
risks
113
noncompliance so that the court can retain the semblance of authority.
F.

Cooperation'sLimits
As is apparent, the cooperation regime that undergirds international

criminal courts significantly and systematically affects the ability of

defendants to provide for their own defense.11 4 Defendants are limited by the
structure of these courts in their ability to procure evidence and witnesses and
to have orders issued on their behalf enforced, despite statutory and judicially
imposed obligations on states. Moreover, defendants' opportunities for getting
evidence, witnesses, and orders enforced are substantially less than those of
the prosecutor, who has all the powers of her office, and often the sympathies
of governments, on her side. 1 15 All these difficulties pose potentially
pernicious obstacles to the provision of fair trials.
112. See Peter Finn, In Croatia,Laiv vs. Patriotism:Thousands Rallyfor Ex-GeneralAccused
of War Crimes,WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 2001, at A21; Steven Erlanger & Carlotta Gall, Milosevic Arrest
Came with Pledgefor a FairTrial,N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2001, at Al.
113. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISIoN: THE REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS 641-43 (1971).
114. The problems faced by these courts in obtaining evidence from reluctant third-party states
are not unique. They occur (with increasing frequency as states extend extraterritorially the jurisdiction
of their criminal laws) whenever domestic courts prosecute persons for crimes involving acts committed
in foreign states in the absence of mutual legal assistance treaties. See Post-Cold War International
Security Threats: Terrorism,Drugs,andOrganizedCrime Symposium Transcript,21 MICH. J. INT'L L.
655 (2000); see also Bruce Zagaris, Uncle Sam ExtendsReachfor Evidence Worldwide, CRIM. JUSTICE,
Winter 2001, at 4. Thus, before the adoption of the Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
between Switzerland and the United States, May 25, 1973, U.S.-Switz., 27 U.S.T. 2019 (entered into
force Jan. 23, 1977), U.S. prosecutors had a difficult time procuring information covered by
Switzerland's bank secrecy laws. See Lee Paikin, Problemsof ObtainingEvidence in ForeignStatesfor
Use in FederalCriminalProsecutions,22 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 233, 237 (1984); see also Roger
M. Olsen, Discoveryin FederalCriminalInvestigations,16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 999 (1984). For
the United States, the most recent example ofthis problem is the embassy bombings case, in which the
acts took place in Kenya and Tanzania, neither of which have such treaties with the United States. Still,
domestic courts (at least those from systems used as models for the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC) have
significant advantages over international courts when they try to obtain information from third-party
states. They also have advantages when they seek to obtain evidence from their own national security
agencies. In the United States, for instance, the Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 116, provides pre-trial mechanisms for determining the relevance and means of disclosure of classified
material. Even so, "greymail" cases (most infamously in the case of Oliver North) demonstrate the
difficulty of providing fair trials under these circumstances. See Sandra D. Jordan, Classified
Information and Conflicts in Independent Counsel Prosecutions:Balancingthe Scales of Justice After
Iran-Contra,91 COLUM. L. REv. 1651, 1667-69 (1991); Christopher M. Maher, The Right to a Fair
Trial in Criminal Cases Involving the Introduction of ClassifiedInformation, 120 MIL. L. REV. 83
(1988); Richard P. Salgado, Note, Government Secrets, Fair Trials, and the Classified Information
ProceduresAct, 98 YALE L.J. 427 (1988). These sorts of cases, however, are the exception in domestic
systems, whereas they are the norm for international criminal tribunals.
115. See Sebastian Rotella, U.S.Lmvman's Trip to "Heartof Darkness," L.A. TIMES,Aug. 12,
2001, at Al (describing the crucial assistance of U.S. intelligence agencies in the Krsticcase before the
ICTY); Wladimiroff Rights of Suspects and Accused, supra note 13, at 443-46. The Office of the
Prosecutor has a significant advantage in financial resources as well. A number of defendants have

THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

V

[Vol. 27: 111

DIFFICULTIES: OUTSIDE INFLUENCE

One might object at this point and say that, yes, it is more difficult for
defendants to put on an adequate defense in international criminal courts, but
it is not impossible. Indeed, whether these challenges are debilitatingly
difficult (or much more difficult for the accused than for the prosecutor) is a
matter for trial judges to decide on a case-by-case basis. These sorts of
determinations, the argument might continue, are made all the time in
domestic courts. This was essentially the judgment of the Scottish court in
Lockerbie and the ICTY Appeals Chamber in Tadic.116 The plea bargain in
Todorovic,it could also be argued, was made in the shadow of a possible trial
court decision granting Todorovic's motion for release if the evidence he
sought could not have been produced. In other words, in all of these cases the
system worked as it should have, and the promise of fair trials was kept, not
broken. The Blaskic case, assuming the newly discovered evidence is
exculpatory, may just be an exception and does not demonstrate the
categorical inability of these courts to guarantee fair trials.
Even if this is so, there are additional reasons to worry about fair trials
that pertain to these courts' dependence on states for financing and judicial
assistance, some examples of which we have already seen. In Blaskic, it seems
apparent that the Croatian government refused to cooperate with the ICTY in
order to affect the outcome of that trial. Similarly, the U.S. government
resisted cooperating in Lockerbie, and perhaps in Todorovic as well. But state
influence on judicial proceedings works not only at the individual case level.
Such influence can also wend its way, more generally, into the manner in
which these tribunals operate and make decisions. As the following examples
from the ICTY and ICTR will suggest, this influence potentially impinges on
their impartiality.
A.

Financingandthe InstitutionalDesire to Self-Perpetuate

A good example is financing. International justice is not cheap and
international criminal courts are dependent on states or international
organizations for their funding. Both ad hoc tribunals receive their funding
from the United Nations; the future International Criminal Court will collect
recently argued that they receive inadequate funding to do their own investigations and that this violates
the principle of equality of arms. Thus, in a May 2, 2001 motion, counsel for Radoslav Brdanin argued
that "[t]he Tribunal has not provided and is not prepared to provide sufficient resources to enable the
defendant to properly and legally defend against the indictment in this case." Motion to Dismiss the
Indictment, The Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-PT, Trial Chamber, International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, May 2, 2001, available at http://www.intcrimlaw.com/
Section%20IV/Motion%2Oto%2ODismiss%20-%2Oresources.pdf On May 16, 2001, the pre-trial Judge,
David Hunt dismissed the motion, though he noted that "if it is demonstrated that the absence of such
resources is likely to result in a miscarriage ofjustice," the Trial Chamber "has the inherent power and
the obligation to stay the proceedings until the necessary resources are provided." Decision on Second
Motion by Brdanin to Dismiss the Indictment, The Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-PT, Trial
Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, May 16, 2001, available at
http://www.un.org/icty/brdjanin/trialc/decision-e/10516DC215720.htm.
There have been similar
complaints as to the funding of defense counsel. See Vincent, supra note 100, at BI.
116. Tadic Appeal,supranote 97, 55-56.

20021

FairTrials

its allocation from assessments on the States Parties,
or from the United
7
Nations in the case of a Security Council referral."
There are at least two possible pitfalls here. One is that these courts
simply will not have the money to be effective because contributing states will
be in arrears. n 8 Another is that states will use their monetary leverage to
influence the tribunals' work." 9 One need only look at the recent fracas over
the U.S. dues owed the United Nations, in which the United States
successfully conditioned its payment on U.N. reform, to appreciate how this

might work.12

Money's potential influence on international criminal courts is also
related to these courts' institutional motivation to continue to exist. As Martin
Bell, a former BBC correspondent and independent Member of Parliament,
recently remarked, "I remain to be convinced that [Tihomir Blaskic] had a fair
trial ....
My concern has always been that there is a political pressure to
deliver guilty verdicts, that if they come up with acquittal after acquittal
people will say what is the point of this court?' ' 12 ' Bell's concern that
international criminal courts have an inherent bias against defendants is a
serious, if sensitive, matter. After all, these courts, unlike general jurisdiction
domestic criminal courts, were set up for a specific purpose: to prosecute
violators of international humanitarian law. It is perhaps this that led the
ICTY's first president, Judge Antonio Cassese, to straddle the line between
impartiality and prejudgment when he advocated the expulsion of Yugoslavia
from the Atlanta Olympics for its failure to arrest Radovan Karadzic and
Ratko Mladic, stating "It would be much better to arrest them now .... We

must stop their political and military activities.'

22

Thus, despite the best

inclinations of those involved, including judges, it is not too difficult to
imagine that these courts could have an institutional bias against defendants
3
because their continued existence depends on producing convictions.12
117. See Rome Statute, supra note 9, art. 115.
118. For a discussion ofhow monetary shortfalls have affected the ICTY, see Scharf, Tools for
Enforcing InternationalCriminal Justice, supra note 109, at 933-37. Cf Jenny S. Martinez; Troubles at
the Tribunal, WAsH. POST, July 3, 2001, at A19 (noting that, even with plenty of money, the ICTY has
come "dangerously close to being in the embarrassing position of violating international human rights
norms on speedy trials").
119. Though domestic courts are also funded by governments (their own), the same worries do
not apply to the same extent, at least in the national systems to which the international tribunals aspire.
In these legal systems, the concept ofseparation of powers allows courts to maintain their independence.
As yet, this does not apply in the international context.
120. See Barbara Crossette, After Long Fight, U.N. Agrees to Cut Dues Paid by U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 2000, at Al.
121. Chris Stephen, British Officers "Clear" Bosnian War Criminal, SCOTLAND ON SUNDAY
(Edinburgh), Apr. 9, 2000, available at 2000 WL 4011654.
122. Alison Smale, Strong Demands to Arrest Bosnian Serb Leaders, ASsOcIATED PREss POL.
SERV., June 13, 1996, available at 1996 WL 5388766. For criticisms of Cassese, see Geoffrey
Robertson, War Crimes Deserve a Fair Trial, TIMES (London), June 25, 1996, at 20; and Thornberry,
supra note 111, at 84. For a defense, see Olivia Q. Swaak-Goldman, The ICTY and the Right to a Fair
Trial: A Critique of the Critics, 10 LEIDEtI J. INT'LL. 215, 215-17 (1997).
123. Cf Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 1995 (noting that the ICTY "is by nature
mission-oriented, and missionaries, judges, prosecutors, and administrators, tend to form a sense of
camaraderie and community"). Judges might also be influenced by their method of appointment. The
judges of the two ad hoc tribunals are elected by the U.N. General Assembly for four-year, renewable
terms. See S/RES/1329 (2000), amending SJRES/827 (1993), S/RES/995 (1994). The possibility of
reelection can make judges more susceptible to political influence. In contrast, judges appointed to the
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Another type of influence takes the form of political meddling. The most
egregious recent example is the case of Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, who is
accused of six counts of violations of international humanitarian law
stemming from his acts during the Rwandan genocide. 124 Barayagwiza was a
leader of the radical Hutu political party Coalition*for the Defense of the
Republic, which advocated "Hutu Power," and one of the founders of
Radiotilivision libre des milles collines, which incited hatred against the
country's Tutsi population. 2 5 Once the extremists took control of the
Rwandan government in early 1994, he became the director of political affairs
in the Rwandan Foreign Ministry. 12 6 Barayagwiza, in short, is accused of
machine that instigated the
being one of the architects of the propaganda
27
murder of more than 800,000 Rwandans.1
It is Barayagwiza's prolonged pre-trial detention, however, rather than
his alleged criminal acts, that has made headlines. On April 15, 1996,
Barayagwiza, together with a number of other Rwandans, was arrested in
Cameroon pursuant to international arrest warrants issued by Rwanda and
Belgium, and, the next day, the ICTR Prosecutor also requested that he be
held pending the Tribunal's decision as to whether to request his transfer to
Arusha, Tanzania for prosecution. 128 On May 16, 1996, the ICTR Prosecutor
notified Cameroon that it was no longer interested in Barayagwiza's transfer.
Extradition proceedings continued from that date until February 17, 1997,
when Cameroon's courts denied Rwanda's extradition request and ordered
Barayagwiza's release. That same day, however, the ICTR Prosecutor again
asked that he be held pending a decision on a transfer request. This time, on
February 24, the Prosecutor decided to follow through on this request. An
order for this was soon issued by the Cameroon courts on March 4, but
Barayagwiza was not sent to Arusha until November 19, 1997. On February
23, 1998, he pleaded not guilty to all counts lodged against him. The next day,
February 24, 1998, Barayagwiza filed an "extremely urgent motion" that
sought to throw out his arrest because, inter alia, he had been illegally
detained. The Court's Trial Chamber denied the motion, 2 9 but on November
3, 1999, the Appeals Chamber reversed the lower court, found for
Barayagwiza, and ordered that he be returned to Cameroon because the length
ICC will serve a nine-year, nonrenewable term, making them, at least in this way, less susceptible. See
Rome Statute, supranote 9, art. 36.
124. Amended Indictment, The Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19,
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Apr. 11, 2000.
125. Id
126. Id
127. On the media and the Rwandan genocide, see, for example, Frank Chalk, Hate Radio in
Rwanda, in THE PATH OF A GENOCIDE: THE RWANDA CRISIS FROM UGANDA TO ZAIRE 93 (Howard
Adelman & Astri Suhrke eds., 1999); and ARTICLE 19, BROADCASTING GENOCIDE: CENSORSHIP,
PROPAGANDA & STATr-SPONSORED VIOLENCE INRWANDA, 1990-1994 (1996).

128. This summary of the facts is based on the decisions of the court, see infra notes 130, 134,
and William A. Schabas, Case Note, Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 563 (2000).
129. See Decision on the Extremely Urgent Motion by the Defense for Orders to Review and/or
Nullify the Arrest and Provisional Detention of the Suspect, The Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No.
ICTR-97-19, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Nov. 17, 1998, availableat
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Barayagwiza/decisions/RELEASEI 198.htm.
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of his detention had been far beyond what international human rights
standards allow. 130 The Court commented, "[n]othing less than the integrity of
the Tribunal is at stake in this case. Loss of public confidence in the Tribunal,
as a court valuing human rights of all individuals-including those charged
with unthinkable crimes-would be among the most serious consequences of
allowing [Barayagwiza] to stand trial in the face of such violations of his
rights.''
Livid, Rwanda suspended cooperation with the ICTR, thereby
effectively halting all of the Tribunal's investigations. 132 Rwanda refused to
grant a visa to the Tribunal's chief prosecutor, and one of the ICTR's trials
had to be postponed because Rwanda refused to allow sixteen Rwandan
witnesses to travel to the Court to testify. 133 Faced with the very real
possibility that ICTR would disintegrate under her watch, Carla Del Ponte, the
Chief Prosecutor, assured the Rwandan government that she would do
everything in her power to convince the Appeals Chamber to reverse its
decision. On November 19, 1999, she notified the Court of her intention to ask
it to review or reconsider its ruling, and she submitted such a motion on
December 1, citing new facts. 134 Shortly before the review hearing took place,
Rwanda said it would resume its cooperation with the Tribunal. 3 5 Rwanda's
renewed cooperation, however, was conditional. At the hearing before the
Appeals Chamber on February 22, 2000, the Attorney General of Rwanda, as
amicus curiae, "openly threatened the non co-operation of the peoples of
Rwanda with the Tribunal if faced with an 136
unfavourable Decision by the
Appeals Chamber on the Motion for Review.',
On March 31, 2000, the Appeals Chamber reversed its earlier decision.
Though Barayagwiza's rights had been violated by prolonged pretrial
detention, the panel concluded, the new facts brought to light by the
Prosecutor in her review motion mitigated the severity of that violation so the
remedy of release was no longer appropriate. 137 The judges denied that they
138
had been coerced into changing their decision to release Barayagwiza,
but it
139
outcome.
the
in
part
a
played
threats
Rwanda's
that
is likely
130. See Decision, The Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Appeals Chamber,
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Nov. 3, 1999, T 113, available at http://www.ictr.org/
ENGLISH/cases/B arayagwiza/decisions/dcs991103.htm.
131. Id1112.
132. See Emmanuel Goujon, Rwanda Suspends Cooperation with Genocide Court over
Release, AGENCEFRANCE-PRESSE, Nov. 6, 1999, availableat 1999 WL 25139194.
133. See Rwanda Bars UN. TribunalProsecutor; Visa Refused After CourtFreed Genocide
Suspect, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 1999, at A24.
134. Decision on Prosecutor's Request for Review or Reconsideration, Barayagwiza v. The
Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Appeals Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for

Rwanda, Mar. 31, 2000, 1 6-7, 13, 15, availableat http://www.ictr.orgENGLISH/cases/Barayagwiza/
decisionsldcs2000033 1.htm [hereinafter BarayagwizaReview Decision].
135. See Hrvoje Hranjsld, Rwanda Renews U.N. Tribunal Ties, AP ONLINE, Feb. 10, 2000,
availableat2000 WL 12390478.
136. BarayagwizaReview Decision,supranote 134, 1 12, 34.

137. Id
74-75.
138. See id 1 34; Declaration of Judge Rafael Nieto-Navia, Decision on Prosecutor's Request
for Review or Reconsideration, Barayagwiza v. The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Appeals
Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Mar. 31, 2000, 1 7, available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Barayagwizaldecisions/separate31032000.htm; Separate Opinion
of Judge Shahabuddeen, Decision on Prosecutor's Request for Review or Reconsideration, Barayagwiza

136
C.
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Dependency binds these ad hoc tribunals in clear ways. Though the
choice between limiting the rights ofthe accused and facing the risk oflosing
the ability to conduct trials at all is seldom as clear or as public as in
Barayagwiza, this bind must pervade decision-making, to some degree, in
these tribunals. Defendants, therefore, are not onllo at a disadvantage in
procuring the necessary materials for their defense. 1 0 They can also be at a
disadvantage when a court needs to decide whether they have been accorded
the rights they are due, whether they have received a fair trial, or, indeed,
whether they are guilty or innocent.
VI.

PROSPECTS

As we have seen, the cooperation regime, as experienced by the ad hoc
tribunals, can be in tension with basic fair trial rights. Chief Prosecutor Del
Ponte demonstrated this point most clearly, albeit unintentionally, when, at
oral argument in the rehearing in Barayagwiza, she told the Appeals Chamber
that:
Whether we want it or not, we must come to terms with the fact that our ability to
continue with our prosecution and investigations depend on the government of Rwanda.
That is the reality that we face. [Either Barayagwiza is tried by the Tribunal or sent to
Rwanda to be tried there.] Otherwise I am afraid . .. [that we can] open [the door] of the
prison [and let everyone go]. 141

To its credit, the Appeals Chamber resisted Del Ponte's conclusion, but the
problem she identified exists for the tribunals just the same, and the more so
for the defendant than for the Chief Prosecutor. In order for international
criminal courts to better provide for fair trials, either the cooperation regime
v.The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Appeals Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, Mar. 31, 2000, 11 71-72, available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Barayagwiza/
decisions/separate31032000.htm; Declaration of Judge Lal Chand Vohrah, Decision (Prosecutor's
Request for Review or Reconsideration), Barayagwiza v.The Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72,
Appeals Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Mar. 31, 2000, 1 3, available at
http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Barayagwiza/decisions/separate3 l 032000.htm.
139. Another rare public threat was made in March 1999 by the Belgian embassy in Tanzania
when the !CTR refused to hand over Bernard Ntuyahaga, a former Rwandan army officer who was
accused of participating in the murder of ten Belgian peacekeepers, after the Tribunal dropped charges
against him. The Belgian government, in addition to threatening to review its cooperation with the
Tribunal, tried to arrange a meeting with the U.N. Secretary-General to discuss the Tribunal's handling
of the case. PAUL J. MAGNARELLA, JUSTICE IN AFRICA: RWANDA'S GENOCIDE, ITS COURTS, AND THE UN
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL 68 (2000).Consider also the testimony of Nina Bang-Jensen, Executive Director of
the Coalition for International Justice, before the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe. See Accountability for War Crimes: Progress and Prospects: Hearing Before the Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., May 11, 1999, at 25, available at
http://www.csce.gov/pdf.cfm?file=05l 199.pdf ("[These tribunals] have to recognize . . . that even
though they should make prosecutorial decisions independent of political considerations, and make their
determinations in an unbiased legal and just way, they are wholly dependent on the cooperation of states
in order to execute their orders... .[T]hey ultimately have to rely on political institutions. They have to
go to countries for intelligence information, go to countries for apprehension.").
140. See supra Part IV.
141. Declaration of Judge Rafael Nieto-Navia, supra note 138, 12 (quoting Chief Prosecutor
Del Ponte).
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must be made to work, or additional procedures must be put in place to protect
the accused.
In the case of the ad hoc tribunals, the cooperation regime's weakness
does not result from the absence of tribunal authority or an authoritative
enforcement mechanism. Both the ICTY and ICTR were created by the
Security Council pursuant to its Chapter VII authority. States are thus under
an obligation to cooperate with the tribunals, and the Security Council could
conceivably decide to take measures against states that failed to comply with
the tribunals' orders. Despite occasional pleas by the ICTY, however, the
Security Council has failed to take such action. 142 Individual states and
regional organizations, though, have used various forms of persuasion to
encourage states, in particular Yugoslavia and Croatia, to cooperate, and this
has worked in a limited fashion. But, even backed by the enforcement
authority of the Security Council and certain powerful states, the tribunals, as
demonstrated, have not always been able to provide for defendants. In fact,
the very reliance on such states may itself create fair trial problems.
If the experience of the ad hoc tribunals should make proponents of
international justice wary of possibilities of fair trials, it is, therefore,
worthwhile to ask if the future permanent International Criminal Court is an
improvement on its predecessors. The answer is "no." In contrast to the ad hoc
tribunals, the ICC is backed by the Rome Statute, not the U.N. Charter, and,
thus, only those states that ratify the Rome Statute will be bound by the ICC's
orders. Moreover, instead of the Security Council, only an Assembly of States
Parties will normally have the formal authority to enforce the ICC's orders
and keep states in compliance. As a result, it is safe to expect that the ICC will
have greater difficulties providing defendants with fair trials than the ad hoc
tribunals-except, perhaps, in extraordinary cases where there is international
political consensus.
In the absence of an effective mechanism that will ensure the
performance of a state's duties to cooperate with international criminal courts,
these courts, themselves, will need to take affirmative steps to protect the
accused. They should amend (or should have amended) their statutes and rules
of procedure and evidence so that they are more sympathetic to the inherent
143
difficulties faced by the accused in the formation of his or her defense.
Thus, the ad hoc tribunals should adopt a rule that gives defendants the same
power as the prosecution to secure evidence and witnesses. 144 The tribunals
and the future ICC should also adopt a rule that states that, when an order
issued on behalf of the defendant for the production of evidence is met with
noncompliance, the burden is on the prosecutor to show that the missing

142. For a review and discussion of Security Council enforcement of ICTY judicial orders, see
Daryl A. Mundis, Reporting Non-Compliance: Rule 7bis, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PRocEDURE AND
EVIDENCE, supranote 25, at 421.
143. The procedures for amending the ICC Statute and Rules of Procedure and Evidence are
stated in articles 51, 121-123 ofthe Rome Statute, supranote 9. The procedures for amending the Rules
of the ICTY and ICTR appear in article 15 of the ICTY Statute, supra note 33, and article 14 of the
ICTR Statute, supranote 33.
144. See Wladimiroff, Rights of Suspects and Accused, supra note 13, at 445. The Rome
Statute is an improvement in this regard.
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evidence was not material to a proper defense. 145 Though the adoption of such
a presumption might, counterproductively, encourage states that had an
interest in the accused being set free to resist a court's order, it would clarify
for all to see the degree of importance of the evidence withheld. Moreover,
this presumption would serve to encourage other states interested in a
successful prosecution to exert more influence on the noncooperating state.
Furthermore, judges on these courts should do more to view the
substantive rights of the accused through the prism of the structural limitations
on these courts. Such a contextual approach would allow judges to expand the
rights of the accused to take into account the difficulties inherent in
international criminal defense. To this extent, the recent decision of the
Appeals Chamber in Kupreskic on the reconsideration of factual findings
46
where additional evidence has been admitted on appeal is a disappointment.1
Though the Appeals Chamber recognized "the numerous practical difficulties
that all parties at trial before the Tribunal face in locating all relevant
witnesses and documentary evidence from distant countries, not always cooperative with the Tribunal," and noted the "real danger of a miscarriage of
justice when a Trial Chamber is deprived of crucial evidence relating to the
guilt or innocence of an accused that does not surface until the trial is
completed,"' 147 the Court adopted a standard that makes it difficult to148overturn
a verdict, even with the introduction of new and probative evidence.
These courts should also provide criminal defense attorneys with better
resources, which might allow them to overcome some of the difficulties
encountered in investigations. 149 There is already a movement to create a
formal international defense bar, which will help professionalize the
representation of the accused. 150 The courts themselves will also need to
provide more money and, through their registries, provide more guidance
(legal and investigative) to assist defense counsel.151 A more formal presence
for the defense within 52the structure of these courts will also increase the
likelihood of fair trials.
145. As is, the burden is on the accused. Article 72(7)(a)(iii) and (b)(ii) of the Rome Statute
allows the Court to "make such inference in the trials of the accused as to the existence or non-existence
of a fact, as may be appropriate in the circumstances," but does not designate which party carries the
burden. Rome Statute, supranote 9.
146. See Appeal Judgement, The Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-A, Appeals
Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 23, 2001, available at
http://www.un.orgictylkupreskiclappealljudgementlkup-ajOl 1023e.pdf.
147. 1d 144.
148. Id 75. To the Appeals Chamber's credit, it defended the right to a fair trial in other
aspects of its decision, i
100, and ultimately reversed the convictions of three ofthe defendants and
revised downward the sentences oftwo others. klpt. X.
149. See supranote 115 and accompanying text; Howard Morrison, The Questfor Justice: Will
the Mighty Prosecution Steamroller Overwhelm the Push-Bike Resources of the Defence at the
InternationalCriminalCourts?, COUNSEL (London), June 2001, at 14.
150.

See INTERNATONAL CRIMINAL DEFENCE BAR ATTORNEYS ASS'N, ICDAA ANNUAL

REPORT 2000, at 12 (2001), available at http://www.hri.calpartners/aiad-icdaa/reports
Annual%20Reportl.pdf.
151. Rule 20 of the finalized draft text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the
International Criminal Court provide for the ICC Registry to give such support. The text is available at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/statuterules/rulemain.htm.
152. For a fuller argument, see Elise Groulx, The Defence Pillar: Making the Defence a Full
Partner in the International Criminal Justice System, Nov. 3, 2000, available at http://www.hri.cal

2002]

FairTrials

Finally, observer-participants (scholars, activists, and the press) should
do better than they have as "watchdogs" on fair trials, sniffing out injustice to
the internationally-accused and working to keep all the relevant actors on their
toes. As Judge Cassese has noted, "it is not enough for the International
Tribunal simply to administer international criminal justice impartially and
with due regard for the rights of the accused. It must also carry out this
activity under the scrutiny of the international community."' 153 The current
watchdog-absent context 154 works to the detriment of defendants, allowing
states to influence, and judges to be influenced. If court proponents truly want
these courts' decisions to be considered authoritative declarations of
international human rights law, they would do well to speak more of the rights
of the accused.
Those most interested in promoting the rights of the accused-defense
counsel, the accused and their families, and some of the states that have
nationals among the accused-have already done work along these lines.
Unfortunately, however, the same tendencies that make fair trials difficult in
these courts also decrease the possibility that these mitigating strategies will
be adopted in a meaningful way.
VII. CONCLUSION

International criminal courts have it difficult. International actors
withhold evidence. They restrict access to evidence. They refuse to allow
witnesses to testify. They decline to enforce or abide by judicial orders. They
silently coerce courts by threatening to withdraw support. To recognize all
these obstacles is not necessarily to prejudge the ability of international
criminal courts to hold persons accountable for violations of international
humanitarian law. 155 It is simply to suggest that international criminal courts
run the risk that fair trials can be a casualty of this pursuit, and that there is no
reason to believe that this predicament will change when the permanent
International
Criminal Court comes into existence-in fact, just the
156
opposite.
Because of the publicity it will garner, some say that the first true test of
contemporary international criminal courts will be the trial of former
Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic. Doubters wonder if states will be as
willing to cooperate with the defense (assuming Milosevic mounts one) as
with the prosecution. 157 They also question whether the Tribunal's judges will
partners/aiad-icdaa/reports/defencepillar.htm.
153. Antonio Cassese, Foreword, INT'LREv. RED CROss, No. 321, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 602.
154. See supranotes 4-5 and accompanying text.
155. Such recognition should not be considered a reason to ignore the good that these tribunals
achieve, nor to say that the statutory rights of the accused are deficient, nor to condemn the trials as
victors' justice, nor to condemn the enterprise ofinternational prosecutions per se.
156. One might say that it will take time for these courts to reflect a level of excellence that has
taken most domestic courts a long time to attain, and that it is unreasonable to expect perfection at this

stage ofthe development of international criminal justice. To do so, the argument might continue, would
be to impose an unattainable standard and, thereby, make the establishment of international criminal
courts impossible. This, though, is a concession that these courts might not be able to provide fair trials;
whether we might want to create such courts, in any event, is another (albeit related) question.
157. See, e.g., Aleksa Djilas, The PoliticizedTribunal, IWPR TRmBuNAL UPDATE (July 16-21,
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be brave enough to order the CIA and other intelligence services to reveal
information that might be damaging to them and their governments. Will
states, in other words, give Milosevic evidence that might inculpate or
embarrass their own leaders?
This Article suggests that the Milosevic proceedings are not a true test:
when states are interested in providing for fair trials, they will take place; and
when sufficient publicity is focused on courts, judges will make sure that
every procedural nicety and right is observed. There exists an excellent chance
that Milosevic will receive a fair trial, and every indication from the pre-trial
proceedings is evidence that this is the course that the trial will take. For this
reason, Milosevic's trial is anomalous-a poor paradigm for how these courts
have functioned in the past, and how they might operate in the future. The real
challenge is not the trial of Slobodan Milosevic, but rather how to devise a
method to ensure that every defendant standing before an international
criminal court will receive the same fair treatment as Milosevic.

2001), availableat http://www.iwpr.net/index.pl?archive/tri/tri-230_2_eng.txt.

